UNAMA Document Library

3 February 2011 - The present report, which has been prepared pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1612 (2005) and 1882 (2009), is the second country report on the situation of children and armed conflict in Afghanistan. It covers a period of two years, from 1 September 2008 to 30 August 2010. Full report

22 December 2010 - I thank you, Madam President, for giving us the opportunity as the year draws to a close to review, together with the Security Council, the situation in Afghanistan from the United Nations point of view during a period of many developments.

But before doing so, I would like on behalf of all of my Afghan, United Nations, and national and international
colleagues, and frankly of the whole international diplomatic community in Kabul, to pay tribute and to pay our
respects to the memory of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. I was told by someone that his last words to an Afghan
doctor who started treating him when he went to the hospital were “Please work for peace in Afghanistan”. We are
grateful to him and we thank him for his passionate commitment to assisting the Afghan people in seeking their own
political stability. I would like to conclude this reflection with a few seconds of personal prayer and silence.

Thank you, Madam President.

My presentation, which will be short as the report has already been issued, will focus on the following topics: the
security situation and its linkage to the NATO summit in Lisbon, transition, aid coherence/realignment, human
rights, reconciliation, regional engagement, the serious issue of the drugs affecting Afghanistan and neighbouring
countries, the elections, and some brief remarks on the budget.

With regard to the security situation, the combined increased activities by Afghan and International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) forces are intensifying and are showing results. At the same time, we are detecting from
anti-Government elements attempts to show on their side some spectacular attacks in order to dilute the feeling of a
change of momentum. What does that mean? It means that we should be expecting and should be ready for, I am
afraid, a tense security environment over the next few months. Our assessment is that the situation may get worse
before it gets better. And the proof of that was the attack on the United Nations centre at Herat, where 21 of our
colleagues were stationed. They all survived, thanks to luck, good preparation, strong support from the Afghan
security forces around them and our own private security company linked to the Gurkha support. But it is a signal; it
is a message.

The Lisbon NATO summit, in our view, was very successful. The linking of the two dates — 2011 and 2014 — as a
long beginning of a long end contributed to establishing a much clearer perspective for all international, regional and
national players about mutual commitment to Afghanistan.

With regard to transition, the message is clear, and I am sure that we are all hearing it: allow a more rapid delegation
of responsibility and ownership to the Afghan authorities. In other words — to use a slogan that we heard in Lisbon
and which I think is a very good one — to help, support and assist the Afghan authorities to stand on their own, but
not to stand alone.


The United Nations system and I myself, on behalf of the Secretary-General, are planning — as we are expected to
do by this Council and, above all, by the Afghan authorities — to increase, security permitting, our own capacity in
the areas where transition is expected to take place and also in areas where security is improving, in order to do what
we should be doing — doing much more to assist in capacity-building and support for Afghan ownership of Afghan
territory.

We believe that, with the leadership of the Afghan authorities and Mr. Ashraf Ghani, together with the teams that
have been established, we are moving in the right direction on transition, and the United Nations, as I said, will, with
the blessing of the Council, be doing its part.

On aid coherence, since the Kabul Conference we have been talking about aid realignment, which then leads to aid
coherence. Aid realignment means, basically, what we heard at the Kabul Conference, which calls for a stronger and
more effective realignment of all bilateral and multilateral aid along the lines of the priorities set by the Afghan
authorities, according to clear benchmarks set by both sides.

The United Nations, that is, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), working closely in
partnership and as co-Chair of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, which is the institution that was
created jointly by the Afghan authorities and the international community to actually assist, monitor and support the
realignment, will be increasing its activities in that field. I have new teams coming in. One senior colleague, in
particular, will join me, who has been assigned particularly to support the enhancement.

Human rights are crucial. Everybody recognizes that, and we are working on that issue. The priority for us is to be
able to continue to issue reports that are seen as significant because they are considered to be objective and frank —
sometimes too frank — but they nonetheless help everyone to realize that the civilian rights in human rights in
Afghanistan are important for the Afghans.

The issue of civilian casualties has been an issue included in our report, and we will continue to include that issue,
hoping to improve that situation further with fine-tuning. We have heard from President Karzai several times, as
well as from many other partners, how important it is to actually address the issue of civilian casualties in the best
possible way; hopefully we will not see repetitions of the figures we have seen so far. There has, however, been an
increase, as the Council knows.

On the issue of women, reports are coming out — and more will come out — about the violence affecting women in
particular. I must say, the results of the election so far have been very encouraging regarding the engagement and the
involvement of women in the future parliament. But we will continue to play our role in that area. That has been
requested by everyone, and it is, frankly, required by our own moral compass.
On reconciliation and reintegration, everyone recognizes that there is no military solution. Frankly, even the Taliban
do so, even if they will not say so publicly. There is no military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan — hence the
importance of initiatives such as the Peace Jirga and the establishment, by President Karzai, of the High Peace
Council.

The United Nations, through its own newly established Salaam Support Group, in which everyone will be invited to
participate, depending on their level of competence and the requirements by the Afghan Peace Council. That
participation will be based on competence, the preparation of reports, visions and substantive and substantial support
for what could suddenly become an important and accelerated level of dialogue. Additionally, that support will
come in the form of logistics. What the Council is helping us with, by asking for a strong logistical capacity, is being
put at the disposal of the Afghans, who are going to talk to each other, both inside or outside Afghanistan. That has
already been requested three times, and we have provided it on the Council’s behalf. Then, of course, confidencebuilding
measures represent an area where the United Nations, the Security Council and the Mission can help in
eventually facilitating or explaining how to better implement such measures, if and when they are required.

On regional engagements, everybody again recognizes that if there is — and when there is, insha’allah — actual
involvement in a dialogue, it will be possible to sustain national dialogue only through a long-term constructive
engagement by all regional players, and that means not only the immediate neighbours, but also the distant and
concerned neighbours. In that sense, many initiatives are taking place. As we speak, if I am not mistaken, President
Karzai is in Ankara for discussions facilitated by the Turkish Government on a trilateral basis. I think many more
meetings are likely to take place in that context in the coming year. I understand that even in Washington, D.C.,
there is the possibility of a trilateral opportunity sometime early next year. All those bilateral, trilateral and regional
initiatives are welcome and should be supported in the right direction.

The United Nations in Kabul is doing its part in the Kabul Silk Road initiative and is supporting other initiatives by
regional players. We understand that, by the end of next year, in November, another Bonn conference will possibly
take place, as announced at the NATO summit, and it will probably be — and I do not want to prejudge here the
decision by the Turkish authorities — preceded by another regional opportunity and discussion of the type we have
had in the past. Whatever the case, we will play a role, because we recognize that all members of the regional
context are also Members of the United Nations.

On the issue of drugs, which is linked to the question of regional issues, there has been a substantial increase in drug
production in spite of a disease affecting drug production that we hope was sent by God. It has also, unfortunately,
contributed to an increase in price and therefore also to an increase in interest in producing, selling, transporting and
storing drugs. That is affecting 900,000 Afghans and major neighbours, both close and distant. We welcome the visit
to Kabul of the new Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, who has been very
engaged and has been giving renewed energy to the initiatives at the regional and national levels in that context.
On elections, allow me to make a few points — actually eight, but each of them short — on behalf of the diplomatic
community in Kabul and myself.

First, although it is late, we can never stress enough how proud all of us are and should be and must congratulate the
Afghan people, the Afghan National Security Forces and President Karzai for having held elections in a country
that, we know, is in a conflict and is facing very challenging circumstances.

Second, at the end of the day, 4.2 million Afghans, out of 10.5 million eligible voters, voted despite the security
situation and in spite of two serious warnings from the Taliban to not go to vote.

Third, we recognize the diligent, committed and intense work carried out by the two Afghan independent electoral
commissions nominated by the President.

Fourth, the United Nations, the Russian Federation, the United States, the European Union, Japan, Canada and
Turkey have all welcomed the announcement — I repeat, the announcement — by the electoral commissions on 24
November, and finally on 30 November, of the certification of the results of the 18 September Wolesi Jirga
elections.

Fifth, the elections of 18 September, like all other previous elections, included substantial numbers of cases of fraud
and irregularities. That is regrettable, but we are dealing with a young democracy in a very difficult environment.
Both the Independent Electoral Commission and the Electoral Complaints Commission, the two electoral
commissions, working together, tried and did a lot of work, we have to recognize, in trying to remove those cases of
fraud that they were able to detect. By doing so, they sent a signal against impunity, which might have been an
important message for all Afghans to hear.

Sixth, we have to recognize the independence of all Afghan institutions, both electoral and judiciary, and that they
act within their clearly defined areas of competence and in accordance with the relevant Afghan laws and the
Afghan Constitution.

Seventh, with the certification of all results by the bodies mandated by the law, the two Electoral Commissions, the
electoral process is now procedurally concluded. Notwithstanding whatever the judiciary system will have to do,
following its own procedures, the expected next steps are the inauguration of the new Parliament, pursuant to the
electoral law.

Finally, we welcome the announcement by President Karzai’s spokesperson that the President intends to inaugurate
the new Parliament by the end of January. Now that we have gone through the electoral process, we must look into
electoral reform. We have been discussing the issue with all Afghan authorities and members of Parliament. The
feeling is that there is a need for the sort of electoral reform that will help to prevent some of the problems that have
been encountered in the latest election and in previous elections. That is the task that we will have to take on
together. We are confident that the Afghan capacity for bringing an inclusive political approach to solving some of
the pending issues will bring about inclusive participation — despite the previous exclusion of some ethnic groups
in the elections — hopefully before January.

In conclusion, I wish to thank the Afghan authorities, members of the Security Council, our friend and colleague
who is the European Union representative in Kabul, and our friends and colleagues representing the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul for the support that we have consistently received in implementing the
UNAMA mandate, which can only be fulfilled — and incrementally so — if the necessary resources are allocated to
it in the next budget.

10 December 2010 - This report provides a summary of key political and security developments during the period under review, including electoral updates and the transition to Afghan responsibility for security and peace and reintegration. Full report

English

29 September 2010 - I thank you, Sir, for giving us the opportunity on behalf of the whole United Nations system in Afghanistan to give the Council a brief update.

Much has happened, as is often the case in Afghanistan, during these past few months. Since my last briefing, some key events have taken place. I would like to review some of those events, which preceded the recent and highly anticipated parliamentary elections, in order not to lose sight of the progress that is being made in Afghanistan.

Let me begin with something the Council is very familiar with, since many of us attended it at the time - the Kabul Conference. The Conference, which was held on 20 July, did indeed reinforce the Government's commitment to assuming greater control of its own future. That was the message we got from the Conference.

The substantive preparations undertaken, and which addressed a lot of varied issues, involved extensive cooperation between ministries and required a high level of engagement on the part of the international community with the Afghan authorities and with civil society. The Government of Afghanistan, including its own Afghan National Security Forces - and I am glad to see that our friend the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan is here with us to hear it publicly - should be commended, because everyone who attended the Conference was impressed with the way it was organized and how it unfolded. It required a lot of logistical, organizational and substantive preparations.

The Conference was a key moment in the Kabul process, as we call it now, that began with President Karzai's second inaugural speech. While that speech set a broad governing agenda, the Conference added details to that agenda by elaborating a series of joint commitments. These commitments include the development of a framework, clear timelines, benchmarks for national priority programmes, progress towards the Afghan security lead, improvement in governance and, of course, the very serious and important issue of tackling corruption.

Since the Conference, the Government has taken a number of important steps in terms of technical planning. First, it has indicated its intention - and we confirm that this is taking place - to continue, through the cluster approach - that is, various ministries working together with the international community - to pursue agreed priorities. That was the bottom line of the Conference: trying to identify priorities with which we could all realign our own priorities. Second, it has begun to roll out the 21 national priority programmes agreed on at the Conference.
Third, the Government has made an immediate start to public finance management reforms, which are a concern to everyone, including a review of 14 line ministries, led by the Ministry of Finance. Fourth, the Government has indicated that it will make a start on tackling the anticorruption agenda agreed at the Conference, which also includes the creation of a joint monitoring and evaluation committee by the end of this month.

Let us now look at one issue that has been front and centre for us over the past few months—the elections. The campaign period for the elections ran from 23 June to 15 September, and frankly - we were discussing this just this morning - it was characterized by a very big change from the events of 2005. People were showing their faces, people were campaigning, and women were present. There was an active and very creative style of campaigning in these elections. More than 2,500 candidates - actually, 2,521 - stood for re-election, including almost 400 women—398, to be precise. Of those, only one withdrew during the campaign, while two men did. That also shows the level of courage and determination they displayed in wanting to be part of this democratic process, as complicated and, sometimes, as difficult as it might be. Of the 249 sitting Members of Parliament, 229 sought re-election, demonstrating their own interest, and also, to a certain degree, their confidence in the democratic system in Afghanistan. Of the 2,521 candidates, there were many new entrants and many new, young faces. Of course, it remains to be seen where they are at the end of this process.

We must not forget that one of the main achievements of these elections is the fact that they actually took place. Afghanistan is still a country in a very tense conflict. The fact that an election took place at all, not least in such a short time after the previous one and during a comparatively more volatile period - because security has not improved; in fact the contrary is true - is an accomplishment in itself.

And, while there were no high-profile incidents, quite a number of security incidents did occur. They were not sufficient, however, to disrupt the elections overall. The proof is that almost 4.3 million votes were cast. Of course, we will now need to see how many actual voters were a part of that, but this is quite an achievement compared to the previous and current environment.

While the consolidation of figures on security is still going on, election day security incidents were estimated at about 490, compared to 290 in the previous elections. That represents a big difference, but the impact of those incidents was basically comparable, if not less. Again, the proof is that people went to vote. The incidents' intensity was lower. The overall deterioration of the security situation from last year to this was in any case greater, so that also has to be taken into consideration.

About 1.6 million of the 4.3 million ballots cast to date - we have to see how many voters that means - were in female polling stations, again an indicator of a direction that we should all welcome. This is the point. According to all of us, frankly, it is too early to give an overall assessment of the elections, except for the fact that they took place and 4.3 million Afghans had the courage to go, and that according to many people the systems were better. But the outcome remains to be seen, and that is why we are being cautious about it. We also need to see how even or uneven the actual turnout was over all in the provinces and in the country.

According to everyone, the Independent Electoral Commission has demonstrated a significant improvement compared to last year's presidential election, despite immense security and logistical challenges. In contrast to last year, the location of all polling centres was announced publicly a month before polling day. The Council will remember that last year, during the presidential elections, the list of polling centres was publicized two days before voting, and that was the biggest reason why there was so much concern about fraud. This time it was publicized a month beforehand. That was probably the biggest mitigating measure that could have been taken to avoid massive and systemic fraud. Despite significant challenges, the polling materials arrived on time in most places, and 5,510 polling centres opened, of the 5,897 that had been announced on 18 August. Another major improvement was the security arrangements for the design, use and movement of sensitive materials, including ink. I think that Minister for Foreign Affairs
Rassoul and I can still testify with our fingers that the ink that we used, at least, was quite indelible, and after 10 days I am still looking forward to getting rid of it. We publicly put our fingers in some bleaching products, and it is still there. That does not mean that in some places there was not some faking, but the ink that was provided on a massive scale for the election was quite good.

Having said that, the elections this time had a major security element, reassuring us that at least they would be much more monitored than in the past. We had 397,000 national observers, and they were observing the interests of each candidate on their own. They represented, in that sense, quite an impressive capacity, wanting to make sure that there would be no massive fraud, at least. The sensitive materials were also moved quite safely, in spite of the Taliban having twice threatened to disrupt that.

However, this is just the beginning of the process. That is why, on the Council's behalf, in Afghanistan and outside, we are now being cautious. We pushed, we tried to support the electoral mechanism to go forward, and we tried to encourage the Afghan people to feel that it was worth taking a risk because democracy was moving forward, but now we are being cautious, because we need to see what the outcome is. Despite some retail fraud and, certainly, many problems, the outcome will very much depend on whether the Independent Electoral Commission and the Electoral Complaints Commission will have the stamina, the courage, the neutrality and the determination to actually go over the 3,900 complaints received thus far and be able to say which are right and which are wrong, and take that decision before 30 October.

There are and there will be 2,000 losers - there are 2,521 candidates and 249 posts - and those losers are, unavoidably, already complaining. Again, the secret will be whether the electoral commissions will be able to stand in a credible way. We are ready to sustain and support them, but that is an Afghan responsibility.

Regarding conclusions on the election, on our side we should allow the requisite time for the process, which is until 30 October—8 October for the preliminary outcome and 30 October for the final outcome, more or less, based on the hard work that they will have to do now. We must not make premature judgments. We should note that the positive improvements over last year's elections - from which we all, including the United Nations, have all drawn key lessons, by being careful in making any type of declaration about the outcome before it is clarified - make us cautious but supportive of the steps ahead in ensuring the integrity of the process and accountability to the Afghan people. The final comments will come at the end of the month.

Once the elections have been successfully concluded in one form or another, hopefully, the real discussion regarding the future of the electoral system and long-term electoral reform needs to be initiated. We already know that. Many here are already keen on that, and so are the Afghan people. UNAMA will work with the Government, with the electoral institutions and all relevant Afghan and international partners, in particular the European Union (EU).

The representative of the European Union, Vygaudas Usackas - with whom, as the Council knows, we are working extremely closely - has already indicated publicly the interest of the EU in having a leading role in supporting the process of the electoral reform agenda with the Afghan Government. We will be supporting that ourselves. It will focus, most likely, on the electoral legal framework; the sustainability of the electoral calendar, because we cannot have an election every three months; the long-term status of the Electoral Complaints Commission, which is only ad hoc, making it very fragile compared to the Independent Electoral Commission; a single nationwide electoral roll, because, as the Council knows, we do not have that; and, the mother of all issues, building the capacity of both electoral commissions.

So what is coming up on the radar? Well, the year began, as the Council knows, with setting a series of stepping stones. The first was the Istanbul conference. Then we had the London Conference, followed by the Consultative Peace Jirga, then the Kabul Conference and now the elections.

What is next? Well, a broader political process. We heard this, and yesterday we heard President Karzai elaborating on launching the High-level Peace Commission, with more than 67 members from all sides of Afghan society. We will focus on supporting that, on the basis of the mandate given to us by the Security Council, and on the Kabul process. At the same time we will watch with interest, and potentially with substantive support, the transition, which is probably going to be discussed at the Lisbon summit and then in Kabul.

I am glad to acknowledge the presence here of our colleague and friend, Mark Sedwill, who is the Senior Civilian Representative of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). I have had the opportunity on other occasions here to say how closely we have been working together and how important it is that we are working in that way in order to avoid any type of confusion and to ensure that the Afghans feel that we, on the international side, are all together in supporting the Afghan lead.

Today, I would like to highlight some of key conditions that are essential for the so-called road map on our side in the Kabul process. The Kabul process cannot be just a technocratic exercise. All partners need to engage politically behind the agenda. We know that we can count on President Karzai's leadership in this.

Second, we need to avoid new agendas or competing initiatives. We should focus on identifying the priorities that the Kabul Conference said that we need to tackle first, and concentrate our collective effort behind them. The Government has sent a signal regarding the priorities they seek to pursue: the rollout of national priority programmes and public finance management reform. We need to support that agenda, and we plan to work on it.

Third, we, the international community, need to keep our own part of the bargain by aligning resources - or realigning resources - behind the Government’s priorities. The United Nations is committed in Kabul to a "one-UN" approach, so that we too contribute to the realigning and not just help in the realigning of other partners.

Fourth, we must continue to strive to be more results-oriented, as the Afghan people are asking of us and the Afghan Government. I intend to work with the Government before the next meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), to be held at the end of November, to ensure that the Board, without having to create new bodies or new institutions, can be revitalized and be a follow-up to the actual Kabul follow-up conference.

Of course, all of that will go forward only if it is moving towards a consolidated peace and reintegration programme within a complementary, structured political process that leads to a future Afghanistan reconciled on the basis of mutual respect.

There is a unanimous consensus in the international community that there is no military solution for Afghanistan. In the end, the solution can and should be political and Afghan, a solution that can only be supplemented with broader regional support and a solution that we can all work towards. Yesterday, the Government of Afghanistan took a very significant initial step, and UNAMA, in accordance with its mandate, will do all that it can to support it.

The next few months will be critical, first, in looking at the follow-up to the election, and second, in seeing how transition can become a concrete, well-organized and fair approach in the eyes of the Afghans and the international community.

Transition does not mean exit; it means transition, and the Government of Afghanistan will continue to receive all possible support from all of us with a view to bringing about what we are all hoping to see, namely, a peace and reconciliation initiative.

I will stop there, Mr. President, with your permission.

21 September 2010 - This report provides a summary of key political and security developments during the period under review, including electoral updates and the transition to greater Afghan leadership. Full report

30 June 2010 - I would like to take this opportunity to elaborate on the UN’s activities in Afghanistan and the priorities in the current Afghan environment.

I will be briefer than usual because we had the privilege of having the visit of the members of the Security Council to Afghanistan and therefore you have seen with your own eyes and heard with your own ears what the current situation is on the ground. I want, in this connection, to thank you for your visit. It came just over three months since I took up my own new assignment, and was very timely.

This is indeed a crucial year in Afghanistan, and I think that anyone of you who was there must have had the same feeling. It is a year in which we are all trying, together with the Afghan authorities and the Afghan people, to reach a form of stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan. Everybody acknowledges the fact that there is no military solution alone for what is the current situation in the country. There must be a lot more, and that is what we are working together on. For security gains to be sustained, Afghanistan requires a political vision that is articulated, driven and owned by the Afghans themselves. Efforts must combine to create a sufficiently conducive political environment to counterbalance rising insecurity in a manner that signals that Afghanistan assumes greater responsibility for its desirable end state.

This year has an intense calendar of events and in that sense we are moving in the right direction. We had the London Conference which was very useful. It did indicate a support by the international community to the Afghan authorities during this crucial year. We had the consultative Peace Jirga, which was equally extremely helpful because it gave the opportunity to everyone, Afghans and its international partners, to actually come to a realization that there is a common understanding on how to address the dialogue in order to have more Afghans inside the white tent where we all were during the period of the Peace Jirga.

And the next step is the Kabul Conference, where many Foreign Ministers will be coming and I understand that the United Nations Secretary-General has also confirmed his own attendance. It will be a stepping stone. Let me summarize in which direction the organizers of the Kabul Conference are going. I am referring to the Afghans of course; we will be co-chairing, but they are in the lead. The concept is a public contract, I repeat contract, between the Afghan Government and the Afghan people, offering concrete social and economic improvements. The international community will not be expected to bring new funds but to actually realign, if they feel comfortable with these priorities, the resources that have already be allocated to Afghanistan, bilaterally or elsewhere. This will have several advantages, one will be to further help the “Afghanization” concept, which should not just be a word but should become more and more a concrete fact. And the Afghans feel very strongly about that. They are proud people, historically proven to be so, and even more so these days. They need to feel that the future is in fact in their hands, and this is a good opportunity. If they are proposing concrete programmes, they should also feel they can lead them and, at the same time, be accountable for the results. The event will not be putting more pressure on donor countries, because it will be at best a request for a realignment of the current bilateral funding.

The UN, as you know, Mr. Chairman, is now focussing on 3+1 priorities. We cannot cover everything, and if we did, we would not be able to make a difference. The 3+1 areas are elections, the internal dialogue, regional dialogue and constructive engagement, and aid coherence — which is assisting the Afghan authorities and the international community to avoid overlapping and better coordination of the huge amount of aid which is reaching Afghanistan.

Elections: it is the mother of all issues in Afghanistan, and frankly for all of us. The previous elections did not go well. It would be an understatement to say they went well. They did not go well, and this time we are all trying to work together. They will not be perfect and they will not be elections that you would see in other countries which do not have the same challenges, but they will be better, and they should be insha’allah better. Why? Because lessons were learned by everyone and secondly because there is much more monitoring taking place, internally, by the Afghans themselves.

UNAMA was able to contribute to one major part of the process. As you probably will remember, because so many things have happened since, in April there was a moment of difficulty. There was an institutional stalemate between the Presidency and the Wolesi Jirga, which could have blocked the electoral process. And the formula that the UN, with the cooperation of the whole international community present in Kabul, was able to propose and get approval by everyone for the implementation guidelines on elections. This resulted in: first, a new Chairman for the Independent Electoral Commission and a new electoral team; second, the presence of two international commissioners in the Electoral Complaints Commission with a concurring vote; third, the role of women — the fact that 68 seats were guaranteed for women and if, for whatever reason, a seat would have to be given up, they would be replaced by a woman and not by a man. All that produced a breakdown of the stalemate, and the elections are now moving in the right direction. The new commissioners have been doing their homework. We now have 2,677 declared candidates, of which 400 are women, and they are working on 6,835 polling centres and 19,942 polling stations. 30,000 new voters have been registered; we are getting close to 12.5 million expected voters.

It will not be easy. The main challenge: security. And the second main challenge: security. Because if the elections are tarnished by excessive security problems that may induce closing of voting stations and therefore the disenfranchising of people who could have voted. As we get close to 18 September, we will have to watch this closely in order to assist the Afghan authorities, in the lead of the elections.

The UN and the international community are proactively and actively offering their support, but the Afghans are in the lead. One example has been the vetting process, and some of you who were in Kabul were part of the intense moments related to the vetting. The vetting Commission, lead by the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense and the National Department for Security was for a moment unable to come up with any candidates to be excluded from the elections. The latest news is that a list of almost 40 people has been presented, representing different provinces. A decision is imminent. This is a substantial improvement from the impression we had that the vetting process had been inconclusive. We will be facing difficult moments regarding the elections, but I can certainly tell you that at the moment, the decisions made by the Electoral Commission are reassuring, including to those Afghans who felt the elections could be going in the wrong direction. We will cross that bridge when we get there and I may require your assistance when we get into difficulties, but at the moment, so far, so good.

Dialogue: the second area of priority for our own focus. As you know, this is again Afghan-led and should be Afghan-led, but the UN has the capacity in assisting those types of discussions that may take place, or are taking place. One example was the Hizb-i-Islami visit to Kabul, where the UN in coordination with the Presidency, received the Hizb-i-Islami team. The UN stands ready to facilitate dialogue. We are looking forward to playing a role in confidence-building measures, including on the 1267 sanctions list.

Regional: there is an agreement by everyone that no substantive sustainable development in Afghanistan can take place if we do not have a constant and constructive engagement with all regional players, stakeholders, and beyond. That is why, I myself, with the permission of the Secretary-General have been travelling to several of the regional countries such as Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere, in order to make sure that we would be able to hear their concerns and facilitate these concerns into a right direction. There are very useful initiatives that are being led by countries like Turkey, alongside other efforts such as the meetings of the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan, the Shanghai initiative, and the Dubai process, which is being supported by Canada. And the UN has been leading the Silk Road Initiative, a very charming name, but in fact it goes beyond charm. It is meant to engage countries that are not necessarily geographically linked to Afghanistan, but which might have a political and historical relationship to the country. We are working on economic issues, also on issues such as drugs, or transport and energy. These topics are all opportunities for regional dialogue, which may then also help the political engagement that is needed.

Aid coherence: it is a part of our mandate and a major necessity. The good news is that our studies have shown that there are no major contradictions, no excessive overlap between multilateral and bilateral support. What is needed is more support for the Afghan authorities to take on themselves the aid coherence approach. There is a mechanism which is the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, and it will be meeting insha’allah on 8 July. I myself on behalf of the Secretary General will co-chair. The JCMB needs to be revitalised. The next opportunity for aid coherence is the Kabul Conference. If the international community can go into the Kabul Conference with a donor “realignment contract”, I am confident they can achieve aid coherence.

Regarding transition: this means moving from military to civilian control — particularly referring to the PRTs [Provincial Reconstruction Teams] — from military to civilian, and from civilian to Afghan and with Afghan means. This with the support of the UN, which with its 21 provincial and regional offices — staffed by more than 700 international staff and 6,000 national staff — will work toward squaring the circle to boost Afghan capacity to take over the lead also with regard to security. That is why we are also keen in securing your support for the financial package that will let staff in Afghanistan, but also Iraq, feel they are on par with colleagues working in more secure parts of the world. In that regard, I am grateful and thankful to the Dutch Government in offering their help to establish secure accommodation.

Partnership: You will be rightly asking how are we doing with ISAF, EU, and the ISAF Senior Civilian Representative? The short answer is, excellent. There is a feeling of mutual support, and, although we have different mandates and priorities, the goal is the same; coordination to have a “common messaging” to avoid contradictions. I would like to reassure you that this is moving in the right direction, while each of us are keeping are our independence, neutrality, impartiality but also respect for each others mandates. Our common goal is to help achieve a stable Afghanistan, while respecting Afghan culture, traditions, sovereignty and religion.

In conclusion, 2010 will be a year in which we all need to be resilient, creative, and respectful of Afghan priorities. At the end of the day it will be that Afghans that have to find their own solutions. The Security Council visit was timely and has given a strong boost to UNAMA staff and has also built a strong feeling among Afghan partners that the international community is, indeed, committed to its cause.

16 June 2010 - This report provides a summary of key political and security developments during the period under review, including the national Consultative Peace Jirga, preparations for national legislative elections and development of a national police strategy, as well as regional and international events concerning Afghanistan.

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