Background

This report presents the perspectives of women across Afghanistan on their current situation and priorities. Since the August 2021 takeover, the Taliban (referred to as the de facto authorities or DFA) have introduced more than 50 decrees that directly curtail the rights and dignity of women. None of these decrees have been reversed. The Taliban’s vision for Afghanistan is founded on the structural denial of women’s rights, well-being and personhood.

UN Women, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) have, since August 2022, undertaken quarterly consultations with diverse Afghan women. In alignment with the United Nations Security Council’s women, peace and security agenda and UNAMA’s mandate, the consultations aim to put women at the centre of decision-making, particularly in key policy windows, including the Special Coordinator’s 2023 independent assessment and the subsequent Security Council resolution 2721 (2023). In a situation where women have been systematically removed from public life, the consultations maintain one of the few openings for women to voice their perspectives and exercise leadership and agency.

The current round of quarterly consultations took place between 27 January and 8 February 2024. UN Women, IOM and UNAMA convened online and in-person (where safe to do so) group consultations and conducted individual telesurveys, together reaching 745 Afghan women across all of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. Women reflected on the period from October to December 2023, detailing their priorities; views on international engagement, including recognition of the Taliban; and recommendations to improve the realization of women’s rights. The process consulted women heads of households; women who were internally displaced and came from host communities; rural, peri-urban and urban women; employed and unemployed women; and women differing by age, marital status, ethnicity and educational attainment.

3 UN Women, UNAMA and IOM consult Afghan women inside the country on a quarterly basis ahead of Security Council meetings. Reports on previous consultations include December 2023, September 2023, April 2023, January 2023 and October 2022.
Summary

Key findings

- Women expressed dread and anxiety when asked to consider the possibility of international recognition of the DFA. Around two thirds (67 per cent) stated that recognition would have a significant impact on their lives. Under the current circumstances, it could exacerbate the women’s rights crisis and increase the risk that the DFA would reinforce and expand existing restrictions targeting women and girls.

- Women stated that international recognition should happen only after reversing all restrictions (32 per cent) or after some specific bans are reversed (25 per cent) on women and girls; 28 per cent said that recognition should not happen at all, under any circumstances. In July 2023, a similar question found that 96 per cent of women maintained that recognition should only occur after improvements in women’s rights or that it should not occur at all.4

- Following recent reports of the arbitrary and severe enforcement of the hijab decree,5 particularly in Kabul, women described how enforcement has increased harassment in public spaces and further limited their ability to leave their homes. They fear arrest and the long-lasting stigma and shame associated with being taken into police custody.

- Over half of women (57 per cent) felt unsafe leaving the house without a mahram. In particular, risks to their security and their anxiety levels worsened whenever a new decree was announced specifically targeting them.

- Only 1 per cent of women indicated that they had “good” or “full” influence on decision-making at the community level – a steady decrease from 17 per cent in January 2023. The absence of public infrastructure for women to gather and share their views and experiences, build communities and engage on issues they considered important left them without a pathway to participate in or influence decision-making.

- Women’s self-reported “good” or “full” influence on household decision-making has drastically decreased from 90 per cent in January 2023 to 32 per cent in January 2024. They continued to link their lack of rights, educational prospects and jobs to declines in household influence.

- Women described the intergenerational and gendered impact of DFA restrictions and accompanying conservative shifts in social attitudes on children. Boys appeared to be internalizing the social and political subordination of their mothers and sisters, reinforcing a belief that they should remain in the home in a position of servitude. Girls’ perceptions of their prospects were changing their values and understanding of their possible future lives.

Recommendations

- Women requested the international community to not recognize the Taliban unless they reverse restrictions on women and girls. Women warned that the Taliban’s track record on women’s rights showed that they cannot be trusted to improve the current situation. They viewed recognition before tangible progress on women’s rights as the worst case scenario.

- Women expressed deep disappointment with those Member States that, in their efforts to engage the DFA, overlook the severity of an unprecedented women’s rights crisis and the associated violations of international law, based on the treaties Afghanistan has ratified.6

- Women maintained that the best ways for the international community to improve their situation were to link international aid to better conditions for women, and to facilitate opportunities for women to talk directly with the Taliban.7

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5 OHCHR. 2024. “Afghanistan: Taliban’s Arbitrary Arrests and Detention of Women and Girls Over Dress Code Must End Immediately, UN Experts Say.” 2 February. In this round of consultations from across the country, data showed that women mainly felt (88 per cent) that enforcement was “somewhat” or “very” strict.
6 For a full list of treaties Afghanistan has ratified, see the Ratification Status for Afghanistan in the UN Treaty Body Database of OHCHR.
7 Women responded as follows: link international aid to better conditions for women (52 per cent); facilitate opportunities for women to talk directly with the Taliban (42 per cent); consult with civil society (18 per cent); discuss and advocate directly with the Taliban (11 per cent); other/prefer not to say (5 per cent) and recognize the Taliban (3 per cent). Women could select multiple responses.
How strict has the enforcement of the decree requiring women to observe hijab been in your local area?

- **Very strict (enforced without exceptions)**: 58%
- **Somewhat strict (with some exceptions)**: 29%
- **Very little enforcement**: 7%
- **No enforcement at all**: 2%
- **Enforced arbitrarily or inconsistently**: 7%

Do you feel safe leaving the home by yourself?

- **Not at all**: 57%
- **Totally**: 7%
- **Somewhat**: 36%

What are the main safety concerns you have?

- **Harassment by DFA officials**: 70%
- **Harassment by community members**: 24%
- **Being the target of a crime**: 24%
- **General anxiety about leaving the home**: 19%
- **Being affected by an armed attack**: 16%
- **Other**: 3%
Women believe international recognition should:

- occur only after all restrictions on women and girls are reversed (32%)
- not be granted at all, under any circumstances (28%)
- occur after the ban on both girls’ secondary education and women’s employment are reversed (14%)
- occur after the ban on girls’ secondary education is reversed (11%)
- occur if the DFA promise to improve the situation for women and girls (6%)
- occur immediately even if there are no changes for women and girls (4%)
- None of the above (5%)

Women believe the international community should improve conditions for women by:

- Linking aid to better conditions for women: August 2022: 45%, November 2023: 39%, January 2024: 26%
- Facilitating women to talk directly with the Taliban: August 2022: 52%, November 2023: 42%
- Consulting with civil society: August 2022: 18%, November 2023: 14%, January 2024: 24%
- Discussing/advocating directly to the Taliban: August 2022: 11%, November 2023: 4%, January 2024: 3%
- Recognizing the Taliban: August 2022: 11%

Women reporting worsening feelings of anxiety, isolation and depression:

- January - March 2023: 90%
- August - October 2023: 71%
- April - June 2023: 91%
- November 2023 - January 2024: 82%

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8 Data sourced by separate survey on Afghan women's key priorities conducted by DROPS in August 2022, available at: [https://www.bishnaw.com/survey/15-sep-2022](https://www.bishnaw.com/survey/15-sep-2022)
Findings

"We women are alive but can’t live."

Enforcement of DFA decrees

In line with the recent clampdown in relation to the decree requiring women to observe the hijab\(^9\) (see box 1), women overwhelmingly emphasized that the arbitrary, unexpected and severe enforcement of decrees left them feeling unsafe. While most have always observed the hijab, the style of enforcement, involving the use or threat of force, contributed to normalizing uncertainty in their daily lives and future opportunities. As the boundaries of decree enforcement change and involve a wider range of actors, including the DFA, community and religious leaders, and family members, women have engaged in risk averse and avoidant behaviours such as not leaving the home. These issues have compounded deteriorating mental health.

As part of the “threat of force”, most women described how verbal harassment by the DFA on the street and at checkpoints – and, to a lesser extent, by community members\(^10\) – made them feel ashamed and anxious. One participant said that harassment was sometimes filmed and shared online, leading to a “loss of face”. Women also feared being arrested and dishonoured by being in police custody.

Women described a complex, changing ecosystem of decree enforcement involving DFA officials (especially the de facto Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice), community members, community and religious leaders, and family members. Male family members have become enforcers in families due to social pressure to protect the family’s honour as well as the DFA’s codification of their responsibility for the behaviour of female family members. Under the hijab decree, \(mahrams\) are responsible to ensure they comply and can be punished if they do not.

In this way, men are being coerced into adopting and enforcing the DFA’s misogynistic values.

Box 1: UNAMA consultations on the arbitrary hijab decree enforcement

On 31 December 2023, the de facto Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice started arresting young women and girls in Kabul, particularly in the western parts mainly populated by Shia/Hazara and Tajik communities, for "not observing the hijab". It was unclear how many women were arrested and how many were missing, but the impacts were dramatic.

Following these reports, UNAMA consulted 28 Afghan women in Kabul. Several had directly witnessed de facto security forces rounding up women and girls in public spaces and transferring them to police stations, where they were told to call a male family member to pick them up. The male family member had to pay a fine and sign a document vouching that the woman would wear the full hijab in the future.

The arrests have had a visible chilling effect, resulting in a significant decrease in the number of women on the streets in Kabul. Some families no longer allowed their girls to go outside their homes. In other cases, young women demonstrated anticipatory compliance by not going outside as they feared being arrested and bringing shame on their family. Women indicated that increased enforcement of the hijab decree deepened depression and anxiety.

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\(^9\) In much of the Arab and wider Muslim world, “hijab” refers to a woman covering her head, but in Afghanistan, it tends to describe clothing that covers the head and body more fully. The DFA decree defined the hijab as either a burqa or “customary black clothing and shawl” that is not too thin or too tight, presumably referring to an abaya worn with a niqab. The DFA indicated that the best hijab is for women to not leave their homes at all, unless absolutely necessary. See K. Clark and S. Rahimi. 2022. “‘We Need to Breathe Too’: Women Across Afghanistan Navigate the Taleban’s Hijab Ruling.” Afghanistan Analysts Network.

\(^10\) The main safety concern of 68 per cent of respondents was “harassment by DFA officials”. For 26 per cent, it was “harassment by community members”. Participants could select more than one response.

\(^11\) Under the hijab decree, mahrams are responsible to ensure they comply and can be punished if they do not.

\(^12\) This is one example of how intersecting forms of oppression and marginalization compound each other. Discrimination and persecution under the Taliban on ethnic and religious grounds clearly intersect with gender.
Women described being frequently stopped and questioned by police who interrogated them on their movements, searched their mobile phones and bags, and, if they were speaking on the phone when they were stopped, demanded to know whom they were talking to. One woman reported that the police informed her that they sought to erase women from public spaces, step by step.

Security

Over half of women consulted (57 per cent) reported feeling unsafe leaving their homes by themselves. Women’s sense of security improved dramatically in the company of a mahram, though 9 per cent still felt unsafe even with a mahram present. Security risks grew whenever a new decree was announced and women had to expose themselves to engagement with the Taliban on the streets and at checkpoints. Throughout 2023, security perception consistently worsened. In consultations in November 2023, nearly 50 per cent of women reported that their physical security was either “bad” or “very bad”.

Among those women feeling “totally” (44 per cent) or “somewhat” (47 per cent) safe leaving the home with a mahram, they still emphasized the underlying stress of dependence on another person to accompany them on daily responsibilities (such as chores) and social activities. Some women explained that their mahrams chided them for “wasting time” if they wished to enter certain shops or deviate from a route limited to performing basic necessary tasks. This undercut chances and choices to enjoy even micro-moments of stimulation or leisure outside the home. Some women said that male family members were also afraid and reluctant to leave the home with female family members as this exposed them to DFA harassment (see box 1).

Women pointed to how extremely low levels of social trust exacerbated security concerns. Almost all (96 per cent) reported that “most people cannot be trusted” including their neighbours. They expressed the worry that anybody could be a Taliban informant and report on them. The absence of trust in communities has reportedly created an environment where some women perceive risks as too high to help their neighbours.

Women said that crime was a significant safety concern, putting it at the same level as “harassment by community members” (24 per cent). One participant emphasized the dual impact of discriminatory policies and crime. After she was robbed in the street, the de facto police only rebuked her for being in a public place, showing how discrimination and persecution can leave women without refuge or redress.

Box 2: Consultation with Afghan men in Kandahar

A small group consultation with men in Kandahar revealed a vastly different experience across almost all themes discussed during consultations with Afghan women across the country. Their conceptions and experiences of security diverged significantly from those of women. All 10 Kandahari men said they felt “totally safe” leaving home by themselves. Safety concerns were limited to “harassment by community members” and “being the target of crime”. In contrast, women in Kandahar felt either “not at all safe” (50 per cent) or “somewhat safe” (50 per cent) in leaving home alone. No man reported being concerned about harassment by DFA officials or community members.

The Kandahari men argued that while women may feel a “hidden fear”, the Taliban posed no threat to them. They maintained that the DFA had increased protections for women from harassment and abuse in the family and community and had enshrined their right to inheritance. Men primarily understood safety and security through the lens of the end of conflict that existed in the country before August 2021, including the Taliban’s violent assaults on women serving in public-facing roles and institutions of the Government of the Islamic Republic. They referred to this earlier period as the “bloody war”.

13 In responding to the question (“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”), 96 per cent stated that you “need to be very careful” and only 4 per cent said that “most people can be trusted”.

14 Note that this is particular to a small group of men from Kandahar. Consultations with men in other parts of the country and from other ethnic groups show different perspectives, with other men acknowledging the threat posed by the Taliban to women and some men (for example, from the Hazara community).
Men’s self-reported mental health varied from women’s, with all 10 Kandahari men describing their mental health as “okay” and unchanged in the preceding three months. While suggesting that women “somehow assert their influence over specific topics”, they acknowledged that the complete exclusion of women from decision-making would result in negative impacts on women’s social lives and psychological states.

Women’s participation in community decision-making

“We don’t have the right to decide what to wear – then how can we have impact on the community?”

Women agreed that community attitudes were hardening and becoming more rigid under the DFA, impacting their lives directly and indirectly. Misogynistic social attitudes were increasingly influencing the values and thinking of male family members, both adults and children. Community members reportedly enforced DFA policies, including by harassing women. At the same time, women had almost no influence on community decision-making. Only 1 per cent reported having such influence, a decrease from 17 per cent in January 2023. Women lamented the lack of a voice especially considering their deficit in agency over something as personal as what to wear.

Few acceptable spaces allow women to gather. Even fewer opportunities exist for them to express their interests and needs. Formal pathways for women to take part in public forums – at the community, provincial and national levels – have been dissolved. The DFA has no formal mechanism to respond to women’s concerns, while the absence of women in the DFA’s structure has made it harder for women to seek services and information.

The DFA has wholly denied women’s access to public spaces and freedom of association by restricting their movement and imposing limits on the availability of women-only spaces (such as markets and vocational training centres). Gathering in groups creates a security risk, with women expressing concern that their discussions and identities would likely be reported to the DFA, which could result in harassment and arrest. Anecdotal reports suggested that the DFA is increasingly using women informants. The absence of formal spaces for women to come together has been a major factor contributing to the ongoing mental health crisis.

Women described using informal spaces to share their perspectives and exert some influence over their own lives. Some said that this included discreet moments during health appointments or social events where women were still allowed to gather, such as religious ceremonies and weddings. Women stressed the importance of having safe spaces to confide in someone else, particularly given the eradication of openings for women to publicly gather or vocalize challenges.

Women suggested that alternative openings could increase their opportunities for community decision-making. They emphasized the critical importance of their participation in consultations with international stakeholders, given a context where there is little short-term likelihood of the restoration of their political participation. Despite serious concerns about DFA monitoring of mobile phones and social media, these provided a vital avenue to share views and experiences, build resilience and strength through community, and actively engage on issues important to them.¹⁵

Given security risks in Afghanistan, women underlined how women’s rights groups outside the country played a role in amplifying their voices in international decision-making. They recognized that, following a comprehensive risk analysis, international support for public awareness and trainings on women’s rights in Afghanistan – for women, community and religious leaders, and the DFA – has potential to open some space for women to engage in more public forums.

Attitudes in the home

Women said that their influence and standing in familial contexts is decreasing in tandem with diminishing space in public places. Unsurprisingly, their influence in the family has continuously declined since January 2023. Women’s self-reported “good” or “full” influence on household decision-making has fallen from 90 to 32 per cent in 12 months. Male family members increasingly make all major household decisions. Men’s dominance in the family is reinforced by the DFA’s codification of male responsibility for the behaviour of female family members.

Women continued to report that, alongside regressive DFA decrees and accompanying shifts in social values, their lack of employment and educational opportunities directly linked to their reduced household influence. A lack of education and employment creates a negative feedback loop: without these, and the legitimacy and standing they confer to be decision-makers at all levels, women were even less likely to influence decision-making. Young women were particularly affected as age can bestow women with some influence.

Impact on future generations

“After the domination of the Taliban, women have become worthless in the eyes of my children.”

Women worried that DFA policies and accompanying conservative shifts in social attitudes were increasingly normalized and entrenched in the fabric of society. They warned this could psychologically and ideologically “corrupt future generations of Afghans”. Women described boys’ values and understanding of their lives and future potential as being impacted as much by the DFA as by their parents. Male dominance in household decision-making and nearly all other areas of life extended to boys, who observed and replicated the social and political subordination of their mothers, sisters and other female figures, including teachers.

Women were worried that exposure to misogynistic DFA policies was creating a perception among men and boys that women and girls have neither capacity nor need for social, political or economic opportunities. This was reinforcing a belief that women and girls should remain in the home in a position of servitude. Mothers had notably less influence on boys (6 per cent) than fathers (24 per cent).

The perception that boys had more freedom and opportunities than their sisters and mothers was mirrored by recent data showing that households were more likely to have boys working than women. This demonstrates the gendered nature of opportunities as well as violations of children’s rights. While boys may have greater educational, economic, social and political opportunities, under current economic conditions, many were unlikely to find a job, leaving them frustrated and discontent.

Girls were less influenced in their thinking by social attitudes and DFA decrees because they were rarely exposed to influences outside the home. Women said that “it’s easier to control the thoughts of girls than boys because girls are forced to obey rules”. They were concerned about the impacts of the ban on education beyond sixth grade for girls, including increases in child marriage, confinement to religious education, and obstacles to economic empowerment and learning key skills and

17 Forty-two per cent of women consulted said that the biggest impacts on boy relatives’ values and understanding of their lives and future potential came from “both parents equally” and 41 per cent said “DFA ideas through its decrees”. These factors were followed by “community values” (32 per cent); “school values/teachers’ ideas” (23 per cent); “father’s ideas” (24 per cent) and “mother’s ideas” (6 percent).
18 This disparity was less among girl children. The figures for the father were 14 per cent and for the mother 24 per cent.
19 In 2023, on average, households had more boys than women working. The average household had 6.6 members, of whom 1.6 worked, mainly men (1.19). The other working family members included adult women (0.15) and children (boys at 0.23 compared to only 0.03 for girls). See UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2023. Socioeconomic Outlook 2023.
values to pass onto their own children. Relegating girls and women to the sidelines denies their rights and limits their roles to “societal shock absorbers”.20

Girls saw only one path for their future: to remain uneducated and get married. Many felt “captive, weak, and with no decision-making power”. This stands in stark contrast to their flourishing under the Republic, where in some areas of Afghanistan, more girls were enrolled in the kankor (high-school completion) exam than boys.21

Women referred to the challenges of shielding their children from harmful external influences – such as pervasive misogyny – and teaching their children values according to their own beliefs. In doing so, within a context of harsh authoritarian rule and decreasing social trust, they risked exposing themselves and their children to security threats linked to activities considered “subversive”. Parents have previously described the challenges of managing their own mental health alongside their roles as parents and caregivers.22

Displacement and living conditions

Women said that the main reasons for members of their community to move were difficulties in finding work and poor access to basic services. They outlined compounding challenges in their living conditions, including a lack of education, basic services and transportation, unemployment, mobility restrictions and economic difficulties. One woman described how the absence of health services in her village, combined with no transportation and poor infrastructure, meant that timely medical treatment was out of reach for most people. Women overall reported that living conditions worsened throughout 2023, either “significantly” (66 per cent) or “a bit” (25 per cent).

Three key conditions made a location most liveable for women: safe access to education; health and other basic services; economic opportunities and freedom of movement.23 Women made specific programming and policy suggestions to improve their living conditions. These included reopening spaces for women and girls (in schools, public spaces and sports clubs, among others), providing local vocational training (such as teaching, sewing and jam-making), conducting awareness-raising programmes (for instance, on mental health, anti-discrimination and women’s rights), opening economic opportunities (such as through cash assistance, online employment and livelihoods programmes) and improving capacities to harness online opportunities (including reliable Internet connectivity, laptops and electricity).

Recognition of the Taliban

Around two thirds (67 per cent) said that recognition would have a significant impact on their lives. It could exacerbate the women’s rights crisis and increase the risk that the DFA will reinforce and expand existing restrictions. Thirty-two per cent maintained that international recognition should happen only after all restrictions on women and girls were reversed – or after some specific bans were reversed (25 per cent) – and 28 per cent maintained that recognition of the DFA should not happen at all, under any circumstances. Some women described recognition delinked to progress on women’s rights as an attack on their humanity and dignity as human beings, anxiously urging the international community not to recognize the Taliban until their human rights were fully restored.

20 Women and girls are more likely to be disproportionately impacted by economic shocks: their unpaid care burden increases; their comparative food intake within the family decreases; girls are more likely to be pulled out of school and sold into marriage; and the risk of domestic violence against both women and girls rises. A. Sawas and I. Bose. 2021. Invisible Women: A Gender Analysis of Climate-Induced Migration in South Asia, Action aid.

21 In Herat, girls’ participation was 51 per cent in 2018, 52 per cent in 2019 and 59 per cent in 2020. Omar. 2020. “Herat Witnesses Record Female Participation in Kankor Exam.” Salaam Times, 12 August.

22 Recent research showed that women’s declining mental health contributed to growing intolerance to noise, irritability and anger expressed towards their children. GiHA Afghanistan. 2023. Afghanistan Rapid Gender Analysis.

23 Women consulted chose safe access to education, health and other basic services (62 per cent); freedom of movement (44 per cent); economic opportunities (40 per cent); access and freedom to use (public) transport (19 per cent); social cohesion within the community and absence of conflict (9 per cent); no risk of disasters (e.g., flooding, droughts, earthquakes) (7 per cent); and a clean environment (no air pollution, appropriate waste management) (2 per cent). Respondents could select up to three responses.
Women warned that, given its track record, the Taliban cannot be trusted to do anything to improve the situation for women and girls. They suggested that should the international community reaffirm the exclusionary and undemocratic rule of the Taliban through international recognition, it should consider facilitating the resettlement of Afghan women in other countries.

**Recommendations**

Women expressed deep disappointment with those Member States that, in their efforts to engage the DFA, overlook the severity of an unprecedented women’s rights crisis and the associated violations of international law, based on the treaties to which Afghanistan was a signatory. Women did not accept the current plight as their future. Further, they underlined that the international community should be held accountable for their situation.

Women strongly articulated their expectation that the international community would listen to their voices and make women’s rights a priority in engagement related to Afghanistan. In this process, they stated that the best way to improve women’s situation was to link international aid to better conditions for them. They continued to advocate for the international community to facilitate opportunities for women to talk directly with the Taliban.

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**Afghan women specifically urged the international community to:**

**Advocacy and engagement with the DFA**

- Advocate for inclusive and democratic governance, including gender and ethnic and religious diversity.
- Continue political and economic sanctions targeting the Taliban, including by not granting exemptions to the travel ban.
- Ensure international delegations include women to model women's place in decision-making.

**Engagement with Afghan women**

- Meet regularly with Afghan women to ensure their active involvement and representation in all interactions and dialogues discussing Afghanistan’s future.
- Support the development of a safe, structured ongoing dialogue space among Afghan women so their views are systematically and regularly sought and incorporated into high-level decision-making.

**Funding and programming**

- Support local, demand-driven vocational trainings to increase women’s capacities, skills and economic opportunities.
- Establish and expand programmes that support women to (safely) make their experiences, needs and ideas heard, including consultations and online or phone surveys.
- Engage community leaders and religious scholars through awareness-raising on women’s rights.

**Afghan women specifically urged the DFA to:**

- Remove all restrictions on the rights of women and girls, including but not limited to restrictions on education and employment, and reopen public and private spaces for women and girls.
- Prioritize spending on improving the lives of the Afghan people, including social welfare and assistance, infrastructure and basic service delivery.
- Include Afghan women in decision-making bodies and processes at all levels.

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24 Women responded as follows: link international aid to better conditions for women (52 per cent); facilitate opportunities for women to talk directly with the Taliban (42 per cent); consult with civil society (18 per cent); discuss and advocate directly to the Taliban (11 per cent); other/prefer not to say (5 per cent) and recognize the Taliban (3 per cent). Women could select multiple responses.